1-Introduction
The introduction of the Directive for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions (RRD) 2 explicitly recognizes that effective resolution of internationally active institutions requires cooperation between the Union, Member States and third country resolution authorities. 3 The RRD does not define "cooperation" but it establishes that cooperation should aim at: (a) a group resolution scheme and (b) prevent fragmented national responses. It is an all encompassing concept that includes information sharing and joint decision making. The terms "cooperation" and "coordination" are often used interchangeably.
principles and tools as envisaged in the RRD). The Directive is based on the common principles and best governance practices enshrined in the Key Attributes of Effective resolution regimes.4
The rest of this paper is organized in four sections in addition to this introduction. The The RRD establishes that the objectives of resolution authorities are to ensure the continuity of critical functions; to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability, including to prevent contagion and to protect insured depositors and client relations, while minimizing the public and private costs of resolution (Article 26).
Cooperation with third countries resolution authorities will be facilitated if their resolution regimes are also consistent with those principles; hence, the importance of international coordination. 4 Financial Stability Board Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes are new international standard for the reform of national resolution regimes that sets out the responsibilities, instruments and powers that all national resolution regimes should have to enable authorities to resolve failing financial firms in an orderly manner and without exposing the taxpayer to the risk of loss (see http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104cc.pdf accessed 28 January, 2014)
2-Cross border international banking: From and to the EU
From the point of view of the international banks, the choice of expansion between subsidiaries or branches is not only influenced by differences in regulation and corporate tax rates across home and host countries, or differential treatment of overseas profits from branches and subsidiaries (e.g., the United Kingdom), but also by organizational considerations. Fiechter et alli. (2011) argue that the funding costs for the wholesale group are likely to be lower under the branch structure, given the flexibility to move funds to where they are most needed. International banks with important investment banking activities such as Goldman Sachs, J P Morgan Chase and Deutsche Bank, which are structured centrally for a more efficient use of group capital and liquidity heavily rely on branches. In turn, a subsidiary structure puts constraints on the banking group's ability to transfer funds across borders and could be less suitable for wholesale activities. For a global retail bank, however, a more decentralized subsidiary model may work better because of its focus on serving local retail clients and its reliance on local deposits and local deposit guarantees. This is the case of lenders as HSBC, BBVA and Santander, which are organized geographically.
In practice, even if international banks choose one legal form over the other (i.e.
subsidiaries vs branches) to enter a particular country, most cross-border banking groups have rather complex organizational structures. They run operations through a mixed structure that includes both branches and subsidiaries in different jurisdictions.
In Europe (i.e. in EU and non-EU countries), international banking groups' preference for subsidiaries is pronounced. However, differences among countries are significant. For example, entry into the UK, Austria and Luxemburg banking systems takes place most often via branches; while, in Switzerland, Portugal, Belgium and, to a lesser extent France, it takes place via subsidiaries. In the US, the foreign banking groups use subsidiaries as well. In Latin-American, the share of foreign activities carried out through subsidiaries is even larger. In Asia most activities are carried out via branches, particularly in Japan and, to a lesser extent in China. However, there is a need to distinguish between retail and wholesale banking because several jurisdictions require foreign banks to set up subsidiaries to take deposits from the public.
International banks´ motives for the choice of model of establishment in non-EU countries are broadly the same as for the case of the EU: acquisition of local banks allows a faster establishment in markets, particularly in retail banking that heavily relies on the value of the local franchise. The UK and US remain the far most important host countries in terms of bank assets held by foreign entities. perspective, the trade-off between their objectives and those of the international bank vary depending on a country's status as home or host to international banking groups.
Home authorities might prefer the subsidiary model when their banks expand into countries with weak economies and a risky business environment (i.e. not fully convertible currencies; capital controls). Host authorities might also prefer that model, because it allows them to shield the affiliate from the problems of its parent (i.e. requiring higher capital/provisions). Nonetheless, the key to ensuring financial stability lies in whatever the model (subsidiary or branch) in the design of effective mechanisms to supervise and resolve cross-border banking groups. These include effective home/host prudential supervision and information-sharing arrangements; satisfactory cross-border resolution regimes as well as burden sharing agreements of financial crisis costs.
Within the EU, effective cooperation is the inspiring principle of the Capital Requirement Directive IV and Capital Requirement Regulation 5 (CRD IV and CRR IV) in the realm of supervision and of the RRD establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions. From the view point of financial stability, the regulatory distinction between significant branches and subsidiaries of international banks has been significantly blurred by the similar treatment of systemic branches and subsidiaries for the purpose of coordination among competent authorities including information sharing. Cooperation between EU prudential supervisors / resolution authorities and third country authorities is also the inspiring principle of the relation as described in detail in the next section. Title VI of the RRD deals with different aspects of cooperation with third countries´ resolution authorities, namely the inspiring principles and their exceptions; the legal framework for cooperation agreements; their scope and obligation of confidentiality.
3-Third country relations in the recovery and resolution Directive
References to cooperation with third country national resolution authorities in the context of resolution colleges are included in previous articles of the RRD (Articles 80 and 81).
Inspiring principles and exceptions
The principle that inspires relations with third countries is that of recognition and enforcement of their resolution proceedings, which is consistent with Key Attributes of -independent resolution action in relation to a domestic branch is necessary to achieve one or more of the resolution objectives established in the RRD (Article 26);
-domestic creditors (depositors) would not receive equal treatment in the third country. For example, the FSA (UK) proposed that firms from non-EEA countries that operate national depositor preference regimes (e.g. United States) be required to accept deposits in the UK using a UK-incorporated subsidiary or they must implement an alternative arrangement that ensures UK depositors are no worse off than the depositors in the home country if the firm fails. In 2012, the FSA proposed ban of non-EEA bank branches taking deposits unless they have protection;
6 -the enforcement of third country resolution proceedings would have material negative fiscal implications for the Member State;
-effects of recognition or enforcement would be contrary to public policy.
Hence, the RRD ensures that Member States have the powers necessary to act in relation to a domestic branch that is either not subject to any third country resolution proceeding or that being subject to it, would have an undesirable impact on its economy or would be contrary to its laws and regulations. The underlying assumption seems to be that the third country resolution framework is not consistent with the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes. -branch of a third country bank that no longer meets or is likely not to meet the conditions imposed by law for its authorization and operation, and there is no prospect of any private sector solution (e.g. acquisition by a sound bank);
-no third country resolution proceeding have been or will be initiated in a reasonable timeframe and the branch is/likely unable /unwilling to pay its domestic creditors;
-third country has initiated /notified the Member State resolution authority and the Member State refuses to recognize the third country resolution regime on the grounds that the exceptions meet any of the circumstances described in Article 86 (see above).
These RRD inspiring principles and exceptions are broadly consistent with the Financial Stability Board recommendations regarding resolution of cross border banks.
The RRD is neutral regarding resolution strategies whether single point of entry or multiple point of entry is preferable to the extent that the general objectives of resolution as stated in the RRD are met. Also, the RRD removes obstacles to sharing information among resolution authorities.
What bank financial structures are covered by the recovery and resolution Directive?
Cooperation is envisaged to take place both with regard to subsidiaries of third country internationally active financial institutions and groups (including parent financial or mixed financial holdings) and with regard to branches of third country internationally active financial institutions and groups.
A subsidiary of a third country international banking group is a separate legal entity, which is legally incorporated in the EU and supervised by Member States´ prudential supervisors, with the parent bank having no legal obligation to support it if it falls into distress, although reputational risks are always a consideration. These subsidiaries are fully subject to Union law including the RRD. In contrast, a branch of a third country international banking institution is legally inseparable from that institution, which is ultimately responsible for its financial commitments and it is subject to prudential supervision and crisis management proceedings in the third country. Despite a clear legal distinction between branches and subsidiaries, however, both may in practice sometimes be operated and managed in a similar fashion. In some countries, branches work effectively as independent banks (i.e. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, India, and Korea, branches face local capital and liquidity charges identical to those applied to subsidiaries - 
Cooperation framework with third country resolution authorities
In accordance with the Treaty (Article 218 TFEU), the Commission may submit to the Council proposals for negotiation of agreements with one or more third countries regarding the means of cooperation between the resolution authorities and the relevant third country authorities, inter alia, for the purpose of information sharing in connection with recovery and resolution planning in relation to institutions, financial institutions, parent undertakings and third country institutions (Article 84 of the RRD). Such agreements will be among national competent authorities and will not be institution specific cooperation agreements for In this regard, the RRD is rather broad in its definition of institution that encompasses individual institutions, financial institutions, parent undertakings or third country institutions. 
Box: An economic analysis of the Single Point of Entry resolution strategy
The single receivership at parent holding company resolution strategy is meant to be used only in those extraordinary circumstances where a financial institution's failure and resolution under UK and US laws that would otherwise apply would cause severe adverse effects on financial stability. This is expected to allow continuity of all critical services because the subsidiaries (foreign and domestic) would remain open for business and operating with access to sufficient liquidity (FDIC and Bank of England, December 2012).
Melaschenko and Reynolds (2013) argue that allocating losses to debt issued by a preexisting holding company that owns the bank is likely to entail an unnecessary cost arising from "structural subordination," because debt issued by the holding company is de facto junior in the credit hierarchy to any debt issued by the operating bank subsidiary -and is therefore more expensive. and the legal enforceability of its loss absorbing capacity may be a major problem (unless the law under which a liability is issued recognizes the power of the home country resolution authority).
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Last but not least, a successful single receivership at parent holding company strategy demands a certainty that the home authority would allow resources generated by recapitalization at holding company level to be down-streamed within the group.
In practice, the large continental European banks and in particular G-SIB´s have issued less senior debt at the parent company and more at the subsidiary level than their US counterparts.
International banking groups that operate in the EU will have also to abide by the FSB´s specifications and requirements as regards the G-SIBs and the respective Crisis Management Groups (CMG) as well as institution specific cooperation agreements (COAGs) for planning and crisis resolution. 14 The SSM will be responsible of ensuring that institutions prepare and regularly update recovery plans and the SSM will have the power to arrest a deterioration of bank´s financial condition.
authorities, including the Single Resolution Authority, should take into consideration the impact of their decisions on third countries financial stability although such assessment is not envisaged in the RRD.
4-Third party relations with resolution authorities in the European Banking Union
A single resolution regime is one of the cornerstones of the European Banking Union. The The Resolution Board is responsible for decisions on financing 19 The Board upon notification of the ECB that the bank is failing or likely to fail, or on its own initiative after having previously informed the ECB will place an institution under resolution and will decide on the application of the resolution tools and the use of the single resolution fund. 
5-Final reflections
In line with the internationally accepted best practices, the RRD enshrines the principle of The Directive enshrines general principles governing resolution:
-shareholders take first losses;
-creditors bear losses after shareholders in accordance with priority;
-senior management is replaced;
-creditors of the same class are treated in an equitable manner;
-no creditor incurs greater losses that they would have incurred under liquidation.
The Directive harmonizes:
-early intervention measures by bank supervisors to the highest standards.
In particular, prudential supervisors now can:
-require shareholders to support the institution with cash;
-replace managers;
-implement recovery plan;
-divestment of activities;
-appoint special management.
-bank resolution tools when authorities use an administrative resolution procedure:
-sale of business;
-bridge bank;
-asset separation;
-debt write down.
-Sale of business:
• sale of business to a purchaser (not Bridge Bank) without obtaining the consent of the shareholders:
-shares / other instruments of ownership;
-all or specified assets, rights or liabilities;
-combination of the two above;
• proceeds of sale to shareholders or benefit institution under resolution.
-Bridge bank:
• legal entity that is wholly or partially owned by one or more public authorities created for the purpose of carrying out some or all the functions of an institution under resolution and for holding some or all of the assets and liabilities of an institution under resolution;
• positive net worth;
• temporary because it aims at privatization.
-Asset separation tool:
• resolution authorities have the power to transfer assets, rights or liabilities of an institution under resolution to an Asset Management Vehicle -legal entity that is wholly owned by one or more public authorities-
• if the situation of the particular market for the transferred assets is of such nature that the liquidation of those assets under normal insolvency proceedings could have an adverse effect on the financial markets.
-Bail-in tool:
• conservation mechanism to absorb losses of institutions failing or likely to fail ("trigger") in order to save the firm from failure;
• purposes:
-recapitalization above the regulatory minimumquantitative requirement for bail-in is not a target but a minimum of 8% of banks' total liabilities including own funds--equity conversion;
-reduction principal amount of claims / debt in order to facilitate (1) bridge bank and/or (2) sale of business/Asset separation tool;
-it goes hand in hand with recovery and reorganization measures reflected in the Business Reorganization Plan aimed at restoring long term viability.
• Authorities can interfere on creditors rights without having exhausted shareholders´ rights:
-"carve-out" approach to bail-in (vs "waterfall").National discretion for exclusions from bail-in is limited;
-"no creditor worse off" when "necessary exclusions from bail-in" would need to be compensated with other financing arrangements such as Bank Resolution Funds (BRFs) or "other." The participation of BRFs is topped to a maximum of 5% of failed banks´ total liabilities; -European Commission's immediate approval needed;
-State Aid rules for crisis banks to make sure that shareholders and subordinated debt-holders' contribute to recapitalizations or asset protection measures before resorting to public money.
• Scope of bail-inable debt: applies to all liabilities except:
-insured depositors; -interbank liabilities < 7 days;
-secured liabilities;
-fiduciary assets protected by the insolvency law;
-liabilities to employees, a commercial or trade creditor, tax and social security authorities.
• Conditions to qualify:
-contractual provisions governing any eligible liability that inform investors about the priority of claims in case of resolution and liquidation;
-authorities´ assessment of their legal enforceability;
-bail in is still enforceable even if institution fails to include the contractual provision.
